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MDC
RESPONSE 7th September 2001 The importance of the international
pressure and noose that is slowly closing on the Harare regime cannot be
underestimated The announcement of a break through at
the Abuja meeting on the 6th of September 2001 may appear to many to be the
solution to the Zimbabwe crisis. Why this should be so, is not a surprise. In a situation where the world has
witnessed the shrinking of African countries economically and politically and
their disappearances as Nation States, the demise of Zimbabwe and the
consequence multiplier effect to the other countries in the region would have
been as unwelcome as it is quietus. To many and particularly to those that were
privileged to be at Abuja, any agreement and particularly one that could be sold
and legitimised as a landmark would have been as welcome as it was overdue. There is no doubt that any binding
commitment by the Zimbabwean Government to address the following issues in a
bona fide transparent and consistent manner will be welcome: a) THE QUESTION OF THE RULE OF LAW Human Life, human rights, law and order
have been sacrificed and betrayed in this country by a passe regime now solely
concerned with retaining its crab-like grip on political power. Tens of people
belonging to the Movement for Democratic Change, black farm workers and their
white bosses have lost their lives and properties through violence clearly
sponsored, managed and engineered by the State. In addition, the Press, the Judiciary
and Civic Society have been subjected to the same relentless emasculation as the
ruling party pursued its politics of exclusion and control. More disturbing in
this conundrum has been the fact that those perpetrating the violence, though
known, have hardly been arrested nor prosecuted. In fact in October 2000 a
general pardon and amnesty was granted to these disciples of violence. Under this scenario and given the fact
of violence and lawlessness on business and investor confidence, the Rule of Law
must clearly be prima dona on any agenda. b) ECONOMY The Zimbabwean economy is in structural
disequilibrium primarily as a result of Government's fiscal and indiscipline
and its subordination of the economy to short term political and private gains.
The war in the DRC for instance has had a catastrophic effect on Zimbabwe budget
deficit and balance of payment position. The effect of all these factors is a
situation where inflation tetters on becoming hyper, unemployment well over 70%,
domestic debt well over 5 billion and foreign debt well over US 1 billion. Given this scenario and considering
that 80% of Zimbabweans now live below the poverty datum line on a per capita
income of US$80, it is critical to address the economic problems in this country
more so given the collapse of the public health and public transport systems in
this country. c) THE LAND QUESTION AND THE PENDING
HUMANITARIAN CRISIS Since February 2000 the ZANU(PF) regime
has embarked on an unplanned and chaotic Land Reform Programme based on farm
invasions that has left thousands of farm workers displaced, tens of people dead
and millions of dollars of property destroyed. Most importantly the invasions
and the chaotic Land Reform Programme has resulted in a shrinkage and
agricultural output of 32% in the year 2000 and an estimated 58% for the year
2001. The net result is that in the year 2001 there is a net maize shortage of
600 000 tons and a further 200 000 ton shortage of other grain reserves such as
wheat and other cereals. Thus the question of violence
associated with the land programme and the consequences decapitation of
agricultural input in a scenario where agricultural directly and indirectly
contributes to 35% direct to input, necessarily demands a solution. Needless to say any such solution must
recognise the obligation of land reform in Zimbabwe to address among other
things historical inequalities and obligation to on the international community
to finance the programme. d) THE 2002 PRESIDENTAL ELECTIONS The first critical question that has to
be addressed is the 2002 Presidential Elections. These elections are make or
break elections for Zimbabwe, for if they deliver any result that ordinary
Zimbabweans will not accept, then the potential break up of Zimbabwe as a Nation
State is as inevitable as it is foreseeable. The international community and
indeed the Africans must invest in these elections to ensure that a legitimate
and acceptable result is the progeny. There must be thus insistence on minimum
electoral conditions and standards such as: a) the establishment of an independent
electoral commission to run the elections; b) equal access by all political
parties to the public media; c) a total overhaul and revamping of
the voters roll; d) the absence of restrictions on local
and foreign monitors and observers. The text of Abuja Whether Abuja critically addressed
these issues is one thing. As a matter of fact Abuja did not. The Abuja meeting
fell into the fundamental error of identifying land as being at the core of the
crisis in Zimbabwe. Nothing can be further from the truth. The Zimbabwe crisis
is essentially a crisis of mis-governance and misrule and the fatal desire by
the geriatric Harare regime of wanting to hold on to power at any cost and the
subordination of the true interests of Zimbabwe to short term political gain.
This crisis then manifests itself as an economic and constitutional crisis
permeating the four issues raised above. The land question is but a component of
the holistic Zimbabwe crisis in its totality and therefore in addressing the
Zimbabwe crisis all the above major issues, the economy, the rule of law, the
social services and the 2002 Presidential elections have to be singularly
addressed and not be relegated as minor sole sub-issues of land question.
Regrettably this is what happened at Abuja. Indeed Abuja failed to make a
connection between the violence, lawlessness and indeed the plunder on the land,
with the question of governance and the desire of the Harare regime of
reproducing itself in the next Presidential election. Abuja is thus
disappointing in that it failed to address the true Zimbabwean crisis. Clearly, the Abuja text represented a
haphazard quick-fix solution to a situation that is structurally legless and
that will require a substantial overhaul of the political, constitutional and
legal order. Such is the tragedy of Abuja. Why Abuja and will it hold? Still, answers have to be provided to
the critical questions as to why Harare sought and agreed to the Abuja agreement
and in addition whether or not it (Zimbabwe) is capable of upholding its own end
of the agreement. To us the Mugabe regime, given the
domestic and international crisis it is facing, has little choice but to find
domestic and international respite as it seeks to hold on until the 2002
Presidential Elections which it hopes it will win and therefore find a new life
and legitimacy. In short the Abuja Agreement is a short terms breathing measure. The importance of the international
pressure and noose that is slowly closing on the Harare regime cannot be
underestimated from Washington D.C to Pretoria via Brussels. As of now the
European Union will be debating whether or not to invoke Article 96 of the
Cottinua Agreement and is considering among other things the imposition of smart
sanctions against Zimbabwe. At the same time in Washington DC the Zimbabwe
Democracy and Economic Recovery Bill which has been passed through senate shall
shortly be tabled in the House of Representatives. The Heads of Government of
the Commonwealth countries are meeting in Brisbane in October and needless to
say Zimbabwe will be on top of the agenda with many other member countries
quietly advocating for the suspension of Zimbabwe from this grouping of nations.
Perhaps most worrying for Mugabe is the pressure and force from the African
Union and the Southern African Development Community. In this case, the
hardening up of the attitudes by the Africans against the Harare regime has been
decisive. Clearly, with all this international
pressure, ZANU (PF) had to create and repackage itself in some make-up or lip
stick that would allow it to regenerate itself on the international community
particularly in international finance circles. Abuja thus represents on the part
of ZANU (PF) a serious diplomatic hoodwink in which it hopes to find a lifeline
at least up to the 2002 Presidential Elections. Put differently Abuja represents
a mid-game variation of tactics a huge political chess game of power and power
alone. Whether or not ZANU (PF) will comply
with the Abuja Agreement cannot be a matter for speculation because past
experience ought to provide guidance. At international law the Abuja agreement
does not carry the force of an international treaty and is therefore nothing but
a gentleman's agreement. It is therefore hard to imagine that a Government
which has failed to respect binding treaty agreements such as the United Nations
Charter, the OAU Charter, the Harare Declaration can be trusted now. Most
significantly this is a regime that has failed to respect its own Constitution
and various numerous judgment of its own superior courts. In addition the very same Government
has treated with impunity and has totally disrespected the conditions for
dialogue set out by European Union in its 25th of June Council Resolution based
on Article 50 of its Charter and Article 8 of the Cottinua Agreement. Furthermore it must be remembered that
lawlessness and violence in Zimbabwe is because of the threat of the Movement
for Democratic Change. Violence and lawlessness have been used as a defensive
weapon to virtually seal off the countryside from access to the Movement for
Democratic Change. Thus as long as you have the pending Presidential Elections
and as long as the Movement for Democratic Change continues to be the threat it
is, ZANU (PF) cannot abandon or abscond its totem, violence. Clearly, given this scenario the Abuja
Agreement must be put in it correct perspective by the international community
which must be circumspect in welcoming this initiative. Whilst as they say the proof of the
pudding is in the eating, in this case the pudding is a mirage. As a way forward, we will thus call for
the Commonwealth and their members at Abuja to define a short period of
monitoring and wide consultations in Zimbabwe which must cover Civic Society,
the farmers, the Unions and of course the Movement for Democratic Change. If the
general consensus is that the leopard is incapable of rubbing out its spots then
surely gears must be shifted, dialogue must be abandoned and stronger action
must be taken. At the same time we would respectfully insist that all the
diplomatic initiatives currently in process in Brussels, Washington DC,
Brisbane, Maputo, Pretoria, Gabarone, Lagos and Abuja, must continue unabated.
Abuja should not be used to mitigate the nobleness and the effectiveness of the
unfolding threats and processes. SIGNED TENDAI BITI MDC SHADOW SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND PARTY SECRETARY FOR LAND 7th September, 2001 |